Laboratory report template, created by Mark Gius. See also : https://github.com/mgius/calpoly_csc300_templates
This template was originally published on ShareLaTeX and subsequently moved to Overleaf in October 2019.
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\begin{document}
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%\centerline{\Large\bf Lab 1: Security Audit}\par
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\author{Mark Gius}
\title{Lab 1: Security Audit}
\maketitle
\section{System Description}
The system is a low-powered Atom PC, small form factor
(it is less than 12" on each side, and about 3" tall),
with a 320GB hard drive and 2GB of ram.
The system is located in my bedroom in a house in San Luis Obispo,
on top of another computer. It is plugged into a surge protector,
but not a UPS. The surge protector is shared with several other computers.
The system has no input devices plugged into it
(keyboard, mouse, webcam, etc).
The system is connected to the internet via a switch in my bedroom
that is shared with several other desktops. The bedroom switch connects
to a shared house switch via a cable that runs along the floor of
the hallway leading to my bedroom. The shared workgroup switch
has connects to a Linksys router running DD-WRT (linux), connected to
a DSL modem (local ATT affiliate ISP).
\section{Threat Analysis}
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\hline
\textbf{Threat} & \multicolumn{2}{l|}{} \\
\hline
\endhead
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\multirow{3}{*}{Power Loss}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& The system is completely unavailable in the event
of a power loss \\
Integrity
& Power loss is well known to cause data corruption \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& Random power outage (or malicious conduct) could cause power loss
to the system \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& Power outages can be mitigated by attaching the server
to a UPS. There is not currently a UPS on this system. \\
Integrity
& Steps can be taken to ensure data integrity, such as
journaling filesystems or battery backed disk cache. A
journaling filesystem is currently in place (ext3) and
past experience has shown that the journal is reasonably
effective at preventing integrity errors. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{*}{Shared Network}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& A malicious or incompetent roommate can use all available
resources, limiting system's access. \\
Confidentiality
& Data on shared equipment can be snooped.\\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& Network on which computer is located is untrusted. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& Reasonably sane QoS policies on router reduce competition
for network resources. \\
Confidentiality
& All sensitive data is sent and received via encrypted, and
possibly authenticated channels (HTTPS, SSL, etc). \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{1.0in}{Public OpenSSH}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& Compromised accounts could consume system resources or
damage services \\
Confidentiality
& Compromised accounts could grant information to unathorized
persons \\
Integrity
& Compromised accounts could modify system configurations
and data \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& A user account with a bad password could become compromised and
allow unathorized access to the system \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
General
& OpenSSH is configured to disallow remote "root" login.
"sshblackd" script monitors for repeated failed logins
(brute force attempts) and adds IPs to a "banned" iptables
chain.
All admin accounts have reasonably secure passwords.
OpenSSH is listening on a nonstandard port. \\
Confidentiality
& Sensitive data is not publically readable via file system
permissions, so compromised non-admin accounts are prevented
from accessing restricted data \\
Integrity
& Same as above, except read/write \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{*}{Theft}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& A missing computer is an unavailable computer! \\
Confidentiality
& With physical access to the hardware an attacker would have
full access to any data on the system. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& The system is small and unlocked. Any person who gains access
to the home (locked external door) would be able to easily take
the system. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
General
& The house is generally locked, and roommates are trustworthy.
Roommate's guests' are also generally trustworthy. Strangers
in the home would be confronted by roommates (assuming
somebody was home. \\
Availability
& A lock could be placed on the system to prevent theft.
Currently unlocked, and more valuable systems would be
higher in the priority list. \\
Confidentiality
& Whole-disk encryption with required password to unlock
would protect data. Currently unused because I don't care
and data on disk is not important enough to encrypt. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{1.0in}{``Public'' Fileshares}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Confidentiality
& Files that are not supposed to be accessible can be
made accessible, either by exploit or accidental publishing
of files. \\
Integrity
& Read\--only shares may be written to. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& Samba exploits could allow access to restricted files, or allow
read-only shares to be written to. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Confidentiality
& Not much I can do here \\
Integrity
& Backups to another system can ensure that a valid version
of the file is always available. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{*}{Dynamic DNS}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& If DNS service goes down, or if DNS is not updated properly,
the system will be unavailable except by IP address. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& System is connected to the internet via a ``home'' DSL connection,
with a dynamically assigned IP address. Dynamic DNS service is
used to provide a consistent address on the internet for the
system. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& Choose a reliable DynDNS service. Purchase a static IP \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{1.0in}{Compromised Roommates' PCs}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Availability
& Compromised PCs can consume unreasonable levels of shared
resources. \\
Confidentiality
& Compromised PCs can expose ``internal''\--only resources
to unathorized persons. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& Resources which are supposed to be ``internal'' can be exposed
if another machine on the network is compromised. This bypasses
any rules that grant internal machies more access than an
external one. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
General
& Could hold house-wide security audits. \\
Availability
& Detect and Take down any compromised machines. \\
Confidentiality
& Treat internal and external users as the same, assume that
anything published for an internal user will be accessed
by somebody on the outside. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
\multirow{3}{*}{IRC Bot}
& Goals violated
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Confidentiality
& Exploited IRC bot could be used to gain access to
system resources. \\
Integrity
& Exploited IRC bot could change IRC logs or communicate as
me \\
\end{tabular} \\
\cline{2-3}
& Vulnerability
& IRC software is probably not designed with high\--security in
mind. It is likely that the IRC client can be exploited. \\
\cline{2-3}
& Controls
& \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
Confidentiality
& Run the IRC bot as an unprivileged user to prevent access. \\
Integrity
& Keep backups of the logs that the IRC user can't touch.
I'm not doing this because I really don't care. \\
\end{tabular} \\
\hline
% \multirow{3}{*}{}
% & Goals violated
% & \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
% Availability
% & \\
% Confidentiality
% & \\
% Integrity
% & \\
% \end{tabular} \\
% \cline{2-3}
% & Vulnerability
% & \\
% \cline{2-3}
% & Controls
% & \begin{tabular}{p{1in} p{2.2in}}
% General
% & \\
% Availability
% & \\
% Confidentiality
% & \\
% Integrity
% & \\
% \end{tabular} \\
% \hline
\end{longtable}
\section{Conclusions}
Overall, I would rate the risk level of this system as ``low''. Almost all
of the threats evaluated are known, and are mitigated in some fashion. The
only publically accessible route into the system is an OpenSSH service.
OpenSSH has a long (long) history of being coded by paranoid security fanatics.
In addition, OpenSSH is listening on a non-standard port, which mitigates
the effects of automated bots. In addition, the machine only really provides
one important function, that of a source code repository for myself. Because
I recently switched from subversion to git,
I now have several such repositories that I sync to, so the importance of this
machine has diminished.
The data on the system consists primarily of these repositories of
program code and a collection of MP3s.
These MP3s are backed up to other locations periodically, so their loss is not
critical.
Although incompetence, maliciousness, or malfeasance on the part of my
roommates could cause damage to my systems, they are all generally trustworthy
in this regard. Between technical competence, and a ``cold-war''\--esque
mutually assured self-destruction, we tend to leave each other's machines
alone. I take mild precautions (local firewalls, antivirus for windows,
read\--only network shares) regardless, but I'm certain that none of my
roommates are sitting in their rooms trying to hack me. They might as well
walk into my room and steal the hardware.
In short: nothing particularly sensitive or important,
the only write-only access is via OpenSSH, which is coded by paranoid
security experts, and reasonably trustworthy roommates.
\end{document}